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A New Way Needs a New Foundation
The Principle of Goodness, Law and Society
Ron House, University of Southern Queensland, Australia
Gitie House, Australia
Abstract: It is some two hundred years since the existing major political polarities first took shape: a curious "coincidence",
as this is also the time since the last major revolution in foundational ethics, the overlapping introduction of Kant's principles
and also of utilitarianism. Ethical ideas mould social and personal behaviour and expectations profoundly, yet frequently
without recognition as cause or catalyst. At the recent UNESCO International Conference on Unity and Diversity in Religion
and Culture, one of the authors introduced a new foundational ethical philosophy, the Principle of Goodness. This Principle
expresses an ancient intuition about good and evil, which has found expression in the words and deeds of humanity's greatest
souls - but always in examples, particulars, or implications, and not, it would seem, as an explicit statement of a grounding
philosophical principle until now. As a result, many who respect and advocate what they intuitively see as basic standards
of human decency and compassion often find themselves unable to argue successfully for their insights when faced with
'bottom line' or 'big picture' arguments, which use utilitarian or other outmoded theory to 'balance' competing interests –
almost always to the disadvantage of the poor, the geographically distant, the numerically small, or the uneducated. By
explicitly formulating the 'intuition of the soul', the Principle of Goodness provides a way to expose the intellectual and
moral bankruptcy of policies, laws, and systems that ignore the wellbeing of anyone, whatever their situation. The Principle
is so oddly familiar that it seems almost trivial (whether one thinks it right or wrong): Goodness is to try to benefit everyone;
evil is to try to harm even a single innocent one. And yet, by presupposing this Principle (avoiding the evil and recommending
the Good) as the constitutional principle, it is possible to develop non-trivial guidelines for personal, social, and political
action and societal development. This is a realist theory of ethics, and its specific nature is discussed in another paper to
appear shortly; the task of this paper is to examine the kinds of consequences for our laws and social systems, which would
follow from re-examining their justification and structure in the light of the Principle. The sheer magnitude of this job ne-
cessarily means that the coverage is incomplete, even sketchy, and many connections will remain unexamined. Also, nothing
will be said here about the implications for the individual in personal living, although they are also profound and of the
utmost importance; that, too, will be addressed in another paper. As a realist theory (briefly, it asserts that Good and evil
are realities in the sense that they are summaries of some properties of total Reality), it is essentially empirical rather than
deductivist, developing rather than final. As such, our discussion will immediately draw in observable properties of reality
and the human condition; these, combined with the Principle, recommend certain kinds of structures (but not just one possible
or permissible structure!) as good bases for the development of human flourishing. The outcome of this reconstruction has
certain features of social systems advocated by both the existing Right and Left but (inherent in the process of development
from an independent foundational principle) it is not an amalgam of, or compromise between, these existing political
viewpoints.
Keywords: Law, Social systems, Ethics, Principle of goodness, Organisation of society, Realism, Third Way
Introduction
THE PRINCIPLE OF Goodness is a theoryabout certain (moral) aspects of the natureof reality, namely that Good and evil are real
and are described by these statements:
Goodness is to attempt to benefit everyone;
evil is to attempt to harm even a single inno-
cent one.
Before commencing, it is important to clarify the
assumptions here, and so we must investigate this a
little further. These statements are in essence actions:
“...to attempt to...”. We are normally accustomed to
reality being described in object form rather than act
form: “the tennis ball”, “the proton”, “the top quark”,
and so on. And yet process-understanding of reality
also has a long history, perhaps going all the way
back to Gautama Buddha ([Tucci et al]) or beyond.
And certainly, classical and modern physics has re-
inforced its relevance and credibility.Many equations
of physics are inherently descriptions of process, as
they take the form of time-dependent descriptions
of properties; and experiments on subatomic particles
have revealed behaviour that baffles our common-
sense idea of ‘object’, for example, the interference
of a particle with itself, but which makes perfect
sense understood as a process. ([Feynman et al]
section 3-2). The purpose of this comment is to
challenge the notion that only objects, existing ma-
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terial things, the physical universe as revealed to the
outward senses, deserve to be called real. This is
more than just saying that some other things, not at
first obviously made of matter, can be real or have
a real effect. Such a position is adopted, for example,
in the theory that consciousness is a property that
arises from the incredibly complex combinations of
material in our brains — together with their pro-
cesses, to be sure, but essentially arising from prop-
erties of matter and energy. The view adopted here,
by contrast, is that the Real we are concerned with
is essentially process, and that objects — all objects
— are patterns, or consistencies, in those processes.
This is at heart a philosophical position in greater
measure than it is a strictly scientific one; neverthe-
less, one maymake a case that there are good reasons
to accept it.
Coming to the point, then, the descriptions of
Good and evil given above are asserted to be patterns
in Reality that have been recognised many times
before, even if not described in the general case in
such words as those above. A more detailed discus-
sion is given in [House 2]. Again, this kind of general
framework of understanding reality is not new, but
it is stated to clarify the assumptions of the philosoph-
ical theory. To restate this in prosaic terms, we may
say that acts and intentions have effects, both on
those acted upon and on the actors; that disparate
acts can be harmonious or otherwise; that these har-
monies or disharmonies themselves have further ef-
fects, influencing further acts by others, and so on,
at each stage admitting of positive and negative
feedback processes. Such a social web of interperson-
al and associational relations might very well be (and
almost certainly is) too complex to admit of the kind
of analysis usually performed in the hard sciences,
where, despite the complexity of reality, simplifying
assumptions can usually be made, and then experi-
ments abstracted from the full complexity of nature
can be devised to test assumptions in isolation.
We might be unable to do similarly when dealing
with ‘human’ processes, but it is clear that we can
still ask what social patterns, what sort of human
world, will result from implementing certain under-
standings of moral reality. We might or might not
have a way to predict such patterns, such social
realities, short of actually trying out various moral
alternatives; but clearly connections exist, and if we
once accept that these patterns of interrelationships
and effects are themselves real, then much of the
motivation for alternative readings of ethics as relat-
ivist, subjective, personal preferences disappears.
The entire network of interactions is the ‘universe’
in which, it is here claimed, the above descriptions
of Good and evil best describe the realities we seek
to comprehend when we use these terms in the moral
sense (disregarding different usages such as good or
bad fortune, etc.).
Due to the newness of this ethical theory, we shall
now clarify just what the theory is claiming or recom-
mending, and will clarify this by contrasting with
utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Then at last we can
proceed to ask our main question as to what kind of
society would developwith this ethic as its grounding
rule. Alas, the sheer magnitude of that project will
force us to restrict our attention to a few basic prin-
ciples and likely consequences; a complete develop-
ment is a hugely greater project than we can accom-
plish in this paper. Also, the discussion is intended
only to show consequences of this ethical principle;
there is no claim implied that other principles do not
lead to similar recommendations in one or more
cases.
Situating the Principle in the Ethical
Landscape
The Principle of Goodness concerns the mind, willed
intention put into action (or, when this is impossible,
attempted to put into action). On the positive side,
it recommends attempting to benefit everyone.Whilst
benefit and harm most certainly are descriptions of
effects, the principle concerns the mind only, what
one attempts to do, not the effect resulting from the
attempt. The effect only enters at the beginning, in
the moral actor’s judgement of what constitutes be-
nefit and harm, and what practical policies might
achieve or avoid one or the other. This difference is
subtle and must not be misunderstood; a short ex-
ample should clarify this. A drug dealer, upon being
asked to stop selling dangerous drugs, replies: “If I
didn’t sell them, someone else would.” Let us assume
that this is true. A utilitarian has no answer to this
criminal, short of conjecturing various long-term
harms such as the effect of a bad example or of dis-
respect for laws, etc. ([Finnis] explores this topic in
depth, with an analysis with which we generally
agree. We do not pursue this further, as our purpose
here is to contrast, not to rebut utilitarianism.) The
Principle of Goodness, however, has no such prob-
lem. To deliberately sell damaging goods, knowing
that the buyer is compelled by an addiction to use
them, is to intend to harm the buyer, and so must not
be done. That the buyer will be harmed anyway is
neither here nor there. In this respect the Principle
resembles virtue ethics rather than any consequential-
ist ethic.
The Principle resembles, in fact, the unspoken
principle at the basis of Socrates’ personal ethic
whereby he refused to harm Leon of Salamis,
knowing that others would be sent in his place to
harm Leon anyway: “But when the oligarchy of the
Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others
into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the
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Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to execute
him. This was a specimen of the sort of commands
which they were always giving with the view of im-
plicating as many as possible in their crimes; and
then I showed, not in words only, but in deed, that,
if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared
not a straw for death, and that my only fear was the
fear of doing an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the
strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten
me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the
rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched
Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might
have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty
shortly afterwards come to an end. And to this many
will witness.” (Plato: Apology) This is the kind of
ethic underlying Kant’s maxim that one should al-
ways treat people as ends, and never as mere means.
It is compatible with Kant’s alternative formulation,
that one should act such that one’s acts are examples
of universal rules, for the simple reason that the
Principle is a universal rule; but further, it is a
stronger rule than Kant’s, because the Principle is a
particular universal rule, rather than a recommenda-
tion to freely choose one such rule from the infinite
set of possible rules. It is also akin, in its focus on
intention rather than effect, to the ethic of practical
reasonableness, or virtue, recommended by [Finnis],
as it is choices, acted intentions, by which the self is
‘moulded’, influencing future choice (p144).
The question then arises as to whether the Prin-
ciple is an effective guide. That is, we are not here
asking whether it is the right guide, but whether it
has any ‘content’, whether it actually prohibits some
acts whilst recommending others, or whether it is
sufficiently vague (whilst sounding otherwise, per-
haps) that any act could be reconciled with it. In this
respect, one immediately notices that the statement
of the Principle contains certain words, the intended
senses of meaning of which have not been defined
by us, in particular “benefit”, “harm”, and “inno-
cent”. It is deliberate that definitions of these words
have been omitted from the statement of the Prin-
ciple.
One reason for this is that a genuine ethic cannot
andmust not be akin to a computer algorithm, execut-
ing precisely specified tests upon particular data and
producing predetermined results. Rather, the chal-
lenge is how to give genuine help to the individual
in making moral choices whilst not robbing one of
one’s particular preferences, values, and understand-
ings. The main task of this paper is to show that, in
the realm of law and society, the Principle does have
the power to do this. But to conclude this brief con-
sideration of words and language, we note that incom-
pletely defined linguistic constructs are not necessar-
ily devoid of meaning. Even unexamined popular
notions of these terms have some information con-
tent. For example, one would not expect to findmany
people describing an axe murderer as “doing good”,
no matter which ethical principle, whether scholarly
or popular, they subscribe to. Thus, “Do not attempt
to harm the innocent” is a meaningful injunction
despite containing vaguely defined terms.
Now certainly, further attempts can be made to
better define the terms, to evaluate the vast existing
relevant literature and consider which analyses of
these words are or could be applicable in the context
of the Principle. Consideration can be given to better
understanding the overall meaning of the Principle
given the relevant aspects of the meanings of its
constituents; and, of course, the facts of any given
case can be better or worse understood in trying to
relate the injunction to specific context. Consider an
adult deciding whether to give a lolly to a child. At
first, the adult considers this an attempt to benefit
the child by adding to the child’s happiness. But then
someone points out that they are in a situation where
no toothbrushes are available, and the lolly might
contribute to tooth decay, causing a longer term
harm. The adult decides not to give the lolly; and
this might indeed be the wisest choice. But suppose
the second adult had not been handy, what then? In
the limited understanding of harm and benefit, flawed
though it was, the choice of the adult to give the lolly
is an example of goodness according to the Principle.
But better education, knowledge, or understanding
might well have altered that choice to the complete
opposite, whilst still being an act of goodness. Far
from being a defect of the Principle, this is a feature
of how the Principle works in this universe of imper-
fect knowledge. It is a characteristic that the Principle
is designed to handle; even more, this imprecision
in the Principle’s recommendations is contributory
to its usefulness as a foundation for ethics, for such
must be capable of development and elaboration as
humanity learns and evolves. Further investigation,
philosophical, linguistic, scientific, and so on, is both
desired and expected, without in the least anticipating
that this process will end with all questions answered
and everyone’s decisions predetermined.
The Basis of Law
The modern mind finds it increasingly strange that
in earlier times laws were not thought to be the free
choice of a people or their government. Ecclesiastical
law, Sharia, common law, the divine right of kings,
tribal law, these and more fit, to a greater or lesser
extent, a mould that has become increasingly inac-
cessible to contemporary thought. The perceived
need in themedieval era for kings to find legitimation
of their authority in some kind of claim leading back
to the Roman Empire (Russell, p495) would seem
to be psychologically of the same kind, especially
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as that empire receded from memory and took on a
halo of myth rather than history.Whatever one thinks
of the rationale, it is nevertheless the case that all
observed societies do have laws, and they include a
great deal of commonality, such as laws against
murder and other innately understood crimes. But
from the time of Locke and Hobbes, the idea arose
that a pre-legal condition once existed, or that it is
useful to imagine that it existed. Within such a
framework, it becomes reasonable to think that laws,
all laws, are the free choice of people. Such influ-
ences perhaps led to the British parliament, in 1766,
passing the Declaratory Act in reference to the
American colonies, asserting it had the right to pass
any law. Such a declaration would have been seen
as incomprehensible, or even evil, to many of their
ancestors. (For relevant discussion, see [Hayek 1978]
pp176-192.)
A partial return to the previous understanding is
seen in the amendments to the Constitution of the
United States constituting the Bill of Rights. This
might be taken as just more basic law freely chosen,
were it not for the ninth amendment: “The enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.” Here an explicit acknowledgment is
made of pre-existing rights (for only that which
already exists can be “retained”). And yet no source
of these existing rights is mentioned. How might a
court justify and substantiate the existence of unenun-
ciated rights?
Western society, and many others besides, are
clearly no longer able to use divine fiat, or a holy
book, as the genesis of rights, nor is such a develop-
ment desirable, given the importance of secular
government to freedom. (Secularity is here inter-
preted as impartiality and tolerance for personal
views and opinions, rather than as affirmation of any
positive doctrine of religious disbelief.) What, then,
should form the foundation for unenunciated rights?
One might have hoped that the consensus of decent
people, alone, would be enough. Indeed, western
civilisation has gone far on that basis alone, to the
point that many non-western nations such as Japan
have embraced much of the western ideal. But all is
not well. If an underlying common denominator of
shared presumptions is all that underlies civil order,
that order will be limited to no higher a standard than
this common substrate can support. A particularly
egregious example illustrates this point. Court after
court in the United States has asserted that innocence
alone is not sufficient reason for relief from penalties
for committing a crime (for example, see Cherrix v
Braxton). An advanced western society cannot even
uphold an ethical principle as fundamental as that
the innocent should not knowingly be punished for
a crime they did not commit. This is such an affront
to genuine justice, that it is clear that an informal
consensus on unspoken and unexamined common
moral assumptions is not sufficient even to protect
basic human rights, even when, as in this case, most
persons would agree strongly with this proposition.
There is no room here to offer additional cases, but
doubtless each reader will know of further examples
of injustice structurally embedded in society.
Is it possible, then, that a nonreligious basis might
be found that could function as the underlying
foundational principle of a moral society?We believe
so, and we offer the Principle of Goodness as that
source of rights. To judge such a claim, the reader
will undoubtedly wish to investigate two issues:
firstly, whether the ethical Principle gives sufficient
guidance, and secondly, whether one approves of
the kind of social order that might result from follow-
ing such guidance. The former question amounts to
asking how to relate an ethic, which in a secular so-
ciety must be a personal standard, to societal stand-
ards, which require common, if not universal, con-
sent. Themost commonly-accepted grounding ethical
construct in contemporary society must surely be the
concept of rights (for example, the [United Nations
Declaration]). There is a straightforward relation
between ethical obligations and rights: we suppose
a right to be simply an obligation upon another per-
son or group. Thus we do not possess a “right” not
to be struck by lightning, because no moral agent
controls whether such an event occurs; but we do
possess a right to a fair trial because moral agents,
both individually and collectively as police, judiciary,
etc., become obligated under that right to deliver
such a trial to us. In this sense, talk of rights as pos-
sessions is seen to be another case of process approx-
imated as object. There are variations in the
‘strength’ of both rights and obligations, but the
identification above handles this nicely. In the first
approximation, a legal right for one imposes legal
obligations on others, whereas a right for one recog-
nised in an ethical sense would be considered to im-
pose an ethical obligation on others.
We may extend such an equation, however, by
noting that a government, a civil society, might incur
to itself legal obligations in pursuit of a merely eth-
ical, or moral, right on the part of an individual. The
reciprocal nature of the rights-responsibilities nexus
means that this will give rise to a legal right for the
individual, but the original motivation might not be
a legal, but rather a moral, concern. The promotion
of the concern into law as opposed to a personal
choice to obey a moral code would arise from the
peculiar status of society or government. An example
might be the recent finding by the High Court of
Australia that there is an implied right to free speech
in the Australian Constitution, arising from the need
of the populace to be sufficiently informed to respons-
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ibly exercise their rights to a democratic vote ([Wil-
liams]). This right affects those granted by other laws
(such as defamation). Thus, whilst it is recognised
that one has a remedy against defamation, some
speech that one might have wished to contest as de-
famation is in fact protected as free speech if it con-
cerns political matters. This legal right to free speech
has been manufactured out of the moral right of
other citizens to be informed on political matters, for
no existing law granted such a right, and certainly
no one has the legal right to demand the information
contained in all such protected speech (which would
be expected by complementarity if the entire question
were purely legal). We see, therefore, that even if
something (such as the Principle of Goodness) is an
ethic, not itself a law, there is no reason to suppose
that, acting as the rationale for law, that is, as the
basis for a constitution, it cannot give rise indirectly
to law.
A Vision for Society
In view of the discussion earlier concerning the
nature of this Principle, it is hardly surprising that
we cannot (and would not want to) set out a descrip-
tion of a single, “required” utopia, whose realisation
would solve all the problems of the world. On the
contrary, we would expect that, from a foundational
ethical principle, all manner of practical considera-
tions, ranging from the inbuilt instincts of the human
species, through characteristics of social groups, to
the free preferences and choices of individuals, will
play roles in determining how particular people de-
velop a particular society; and even then there will
probably be more than one possibility that might
have been chosen.
With that proviso in mind, let us consider a consti-
tution such as that of the United States, possessing
a Bill of Rights enumerating certain rights, but spe-
cifying that other unenunciated rights nevertheless
exist. We are not concerned here that the framers of
that document might have had other considerations
in mind than those we are investigating (such as re-
serving rights for the states). If true, that would
merely strengthen the case that the obviousness of
unenunciated rights in the minds of some is not suf-
ficient to establish them in the minds of others, or to
produce concrete protections through the actions of
courts. And yet the impossibility of exhaustively
listing all rights is obvious. So we ask, what if this
constitution specifically names the Principle of
Goodness as the source of unenunciated rights?
Moral and legal inferences follow from this as-
sumption. A statement of purpose for the government
can be plausibly constructed. For example (applying
the Principle first of all to itself), that it exists to
promote the welfare of all and to guard innocents
from harm. Such a statement would be understood
in light of other reasonable principles of jurispru-
dence, such as that the law does not concern itself
with trifles. This principle follows from the practical
consideration that human beings are fallible and
cannot act with perfection, and thus can be innocent
even whilst doing harm. This leads to an understand-
ing that there is a ‘lower limit’ below which the law
does not interfere, but rather leaves matters up to the
moral judgments of individuals. (This is a matter
which speaks also to the excessive law- and rule-
making of our own time.) It would also take into
account that the tasks a government might set itself
in light of this purpose will necessary fail at times
due to the conditions of existence in this universe.
Thus it would be anticipated that individuals, courts,
and other institutions might (and sooner or later,
certainly will) be faced with a dilemma that obeying
a law or policy directly harms innocents. Therefore
policies explaining when it is acceptable to break a
law or policy have to be developed at the outset. This
contrasts with the existing situation, where some
‘extenuating circumstances’ are considered at law,
but the individual doesn’t know what these might be
until tried out in court. And, of course, even these
policies might sometimes need to be broken, so
complete success in formulating these matters might
never be achieved.
The above does, of course, answer the example
given earlier about innocents known to be wrongly
convicted. The innocents’ supreme right not to be
the deliberate target of harm by the government is a
constitutional right that trumps any concrete law or
procedure under which they are being harmed; it in-
validates any such law or procedure in that specific
circumstance, although not in the general case where
the rule is functioning according to its conceived
purpose. But we cannot leave the matter here, as the
case under discussion is too close to the statement
of the Principle itself to be convincing. We wish to
see how things work in more distant cases where the
connection is not so obvious.
Let us, then, return to the Principle itself and de-
velop some core precepts that would guide law- and
system-making. We first acknowledge that the gov-
ernment must not only act according to the Principle
itself, but also assist individuals to do so. Further,
although the Principle only imposes upon all the
obligation to try to avoid evil and pursue good, nev-
ertheless a better system is clearly one in which,
when one tries to do so, one is likely to succeed. The
government, therefore, must view the Principle on
ameta-ethical level, attempting to bring about benefit
to all indirectly by promoting success in the ethical
endeavour on the part of individuals.
Certain familiar rights follow immediately, of
which we only have space here to examine a few.
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Free Speech
Individuals aremore likely to succeedwhen provided
with all relevant information, and so a guarantee of
free speech is needed, not just for political speech,
but for all speech that could inform others’ ethical
choices. Further, as no one can foresee (least of all
from the remote vantage point at which impartial
laws are made) the uses to which information will
be put, any error should be on the side of permitting
harmful speech rather than risking banning useful
speech. Thus, one might be confident that no one
will find a useful purpose for permitting publication
of atomic bomb recipes, and thus ban their publica-
tion; but one need not move far from such clear-cut
cases to find kinds of speech that might be generally
worthless, and yet can help someone somewhere to
pursue the ethical endeavour. And, of course, it is
easy to see that a rational discussion can be had to
determine suitable laws for protection against defam-
ation, without changing the basic nature of the law
as permitting generally free speech.
For an argument for free speech that depends dir-
ectly for its success on our statement of evil, or on
a doctrine relevantly like it in focusing on, not the
quantity of wrong, but on its being done to even the
smallest number, we may thank no less than John
Stuart Mill ([Mill] Chapter II). The extended body
of his argument works for both utilitarianism and
our Principle, as in: “If [an opinion silenced by cen-
sorship] is right, [the whole of mankind] are deprived
of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if
wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
produced by its collision with error.” But in handling
an objection, he clearly alludes to an argument that
only works for our Principle or one like it. He men-
tions the objection that censorship is a good thing
because truth will survive persecution, whereas
falsehood will not, and so persecution efficiently
weeds out the true from the false. Then Mill re-
sponds, referring to the ones persecuted for teaching
truth: “To discover to the world something which
deeply concerns it, and of which it was previously
ignorant; to prove to it that it had been mistaken on
some vital point of temporal or spiritual interest, is
as important a service as a human being can render
to his fellow creatures... .That the authors of such
splendid benefits should be requited by martyrdom;
that their reward should be to be dealt with as the
vilest of criminals, is not, upon this theory [that per-
secuting is a good thing], a deplorable error and
misfortune ... but the normal and justifiable state of
things.”
It is hard to read this and not believe that Mill in-
tended the mere statement of the argument in these
terms as a case against it; Mill’s deep feelings at this
point seem clearly to be that it is wrong to so perse-
cute pure benefactors (by definition innocents in the
case). The obvious completion of the argument is to
simply say so; which, according to our Principle,
clinches the matter. But Mill, perhaps sensing that
such a completion is not in accord with utilitarianism,
provides another one, almost a grasping at straws,
as it makes no sense in utilitarian terms: “People who
defend this mode of treating benefactors, can not be
supposed to set much value on the benefit...” On the
contrary, they recommend this action because they
think (on Mill’s own account) that the benefit is so
great as to outweigh the harm. He then goes on, as
might be expected, to add an argument denying that
truth does always win over persecution. But that
makes the wrong in persecuting our benefactors
merely a contingent truth, depending upon its effic-
acy in serving our self-interests against the interests
of a minority. This seems to be a more or less general
characteristic of any principle deduced from utilitari-
an arguments. Not so with the Principle of Goodness.
Promises and Contracts
Individuals will be better able to pursue their plans,
such as to benefit all, if they have the ability to co-
operate with others, sharing effort and rewards in
ways that participating parties determine to provide
better outcomes than if each works alone. (We need
not address seemingly contrary arguments such as
[Hayek 1944]’s in favour of competition and free
markets, because they do not contradict ours; almost
of necessity, whatever one can achieve in any system,
one will likely achieve more if one is also allowed
to cooperate as well as use any other facilities within
the system.) This necessitates a system of promising,
ranging from personal promises, in which the gov-
ernment will not interfere, to legal promises, or
contracts, which it will enforce. Of necessity this
must extend to allowing contracts for family-build-
ing, namelymarriage agreements, and it must include
enforcing agreed terms in such contracts, as these
underpin the most important decisions in most
people’s lives. Thus we see that systems of justice
will be necessary, containing both rewards and pun-
ishments, working on many levels, frommere social
approval or disapproval, through economic rewards
and penalties, to legal entitlements or punishments.
In order to be inclusive of all, one creating benefits
for others should be benefited themselves, and so
reinforcements for positive behaviour must be cre-
ated. In the field of intellectual endeavour, such a
service was once performed by patent and copyright
law, although we believe that now, this law is so
maladapted to the requirements of the time, and so
perverted by bad law made in response to lobbying
by big business, that the system has now ceased to
function in this capacity; discussion of this is outside
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the scope of this paper. But clearly a reward system
for contributions by intellectual and other creative
endeavour must exist; further (recalling the need to
try to benefit everyone), it must reward without re-
quiring exceptional effort to register one’s right; this
is necessary so that the poor and those living in less
advanced societies will not be disadvantaged in ob-
taining reward for their contributions. (Returning to
the real world for a moment, we regard the design
of better systems of intellectual property reward
(perhaps by re-conceiving the need as something
other than property) to be urgent to protect the rights
of the world’s poorest.)
Shared Social Understandings
To summarise so far, we have a society with a strong
sense of the connection between rights and respons-
ibilities, whether on the part of individuals or govern-
ments or social organisations. This, together with
the Principle itself, which centres ethics upon the
individual’s choices, implies a keen respect for indi-
vidual conscience in its valuation and conception of
usage of rights for both personal goals and in ful-
filling responsibilities.
To proceed further, we must first note that the
Principle also encourages a kind of fraternity. To
explain this, we note that this ethic is not exclusively
altruistic, although it might call for altruism in some
cases. Although it asks that we try to benefit all who
are affected by our actions, we ourselves will usually
be in that group; we are not asked to sacrifice our
own interests for others, but rather to incorporate the
interests of others into plans which will also benefit
ourselves. (In this sense there is profound disagree-
ment with one side-issue in the ethics of [Kant]
(Section I, 7), who insists that ethical action must be
done from a sense of duty alone.) The kind of fratern-
ity referred to is therefore something like “We are
all in this together.” This is a unity of concern (that
we all wish to flourish), but is not a unity of thoughts,
specific goals, or other such things, and is summed
up in the well-known phrase “unity in diversity”,
indicating friendship and well-wishing across cul-
tures and other differences.
Comparing these thoughts with the principles of
the French revolution, we see we can justify both
liberty and fraternity; but turning to equality, no
justification under the Principle seems to be forth-
coming. Indeed, there will be cases where a reason-
able person will not choose equality. Suppose two
businesses can develop a product together, but they
have to choose between two different product
designs. One will net a million pounds profit to each
business, whilst the other will net ten million pounds
to one business and twenty million to the other (all
else being equal). Which choice is the rational one?
Clearly, nothing except envy would prevent these
businesses choosing the more profitable option, even
though it results in unequal returns.
Our point is that a unity of concern, an inclusive
altruism that encompasses others as well as
ourselves, does not imply equality of outcome, nor
that we should always have policies of equalisation.
Thus it does not imply collectivism or the absence
of private property. Indeed, these would seem to be
at odds with the goal we have already discovered for
the government, to enhance the ability of individuals
to succeed in the ethical endeavour. One reason is
that these arrangements disconnect the ethical im-
pulse on the part of an individual from any significant
benefit to the individual himself; a lot of effort for a
large group, averaged, amounts to an insignificant
change to each one. Whilst individuals are capable
of altruistic acts, ongoing lifelong self-denying altru-
ism is demonstrably beyond the capacity of almost
every human being. And yet, when social systems
are planned, so attractive is the call of altruism, of
slogans such as “cooperation, not competition”, that
this fact has been repeatedly overlooked, and the
resulting malfunctioning systems have wreaked ter-
rible misery for hundreds of millions throughout the
twentieth century (for example see [Horowitz p108-
111). Whilst the attraction to altruism is commend-
able, it is clearly an impulse best reserved for indi-
vidual use as and when an individual feels capable
of it. To apply it to others, that is, to design societies
that, by their structure, expect other people, namely
the subjects in this designed society (by no means
all of whom will have been amongst the designers),
to be continually altruistic, enmeshes innocents in a
society that is radically hostile to human nature and
is therefore doomed to fail.
Thus societymust be such that personsmay pursue
plans of their own design, benefiting themselves and
others, but they will almost certainly consider them-
selves and those close to themselves first, and others
less so; this is a self-evident fact about human psy-
chology (but see extended discussion in [Wright]).
Also, different persons will obtain different out-
comes, even in identical situations. This might sound
just like capitalism, but we must remember that it
will be a ‘capitalism’ underpinned by adherence to
a strong and specific ethical ideal: don’t harm the
innocent, and try to benefit everyone concerned in
all your acts. It is often forgotten that [Adam Smith]
also wrote a book on morals. In this sense, modern
‘ethics-free’ capitalism is a serious perversion of
Smith’s original conception. Smith seems to have
intuitively understood that the goal of unity of con-
cern, that is, fraternity, will only work with mechan-
isms that connect outcomes for ourselves with out-
comes for others; by working for the common good
according to our own plans, we might and probably
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will earn a reward that exceeds the benefit of our
work to any particular other, and yet our work should
take place in a genuine society, not merely in a dis-
connected collection of human beings. Thus, para-
doxically, equality and fraternity are incompatible,
and the Principle of Goodness tells us to choose fra-
ternity.
This by no means implies, however, that such a
system would be unbridled. One can certainly ap-
prove of private property without consenting to give
anyone the right to amass absolutely any amount of
it. Just as the need to earn reward for one’s efforts
is part of our nature, so also is there a limit to this
impulse. No human being canmeaningfully conceive
the difference between owning one billion or two
billion pounds, in today’s money; beyond a certain
point the instinct malfunctions, and the tycoon fo-
cuses, not on what actual benefit has been obtained
from the day’s effort, but merely on the meaningless
fact that another hundred million was added to the
number on the bank statement.
Inherent in the development of actual rules and
laws from the Principle of Goodness is the combina-
tion of advice from the Principle with empirical
knowledge. The only reason for accepting a market
system is that it works: [Hayek 1944], decades before
the decisive historical collapse of communism, ex-
plained why central planning can never work: in
brief, because the prices on a free market provide
each buyer with information about the relative ex-
penses (which translates into difficulty of production,
material usage, and so on) of alternative products
and services. This is information that is beyond the
capacity of any human mind to obtain by actually
following all the details of how every good is
provided. Thus, each moral agent may take account
of thousands or millions of circumstances in making
a purchasing choice, circumstances which could
never be accounted for, either by an individual or a
central planner, if they had to follow all the concrete
facts known to all the many actors involved in the
process of production.
We need not, however accept any system uncritic-
ally or in finality, as this is an empirical, not an
ideological, exercise; justification for a free market
in terms of providing information for a moral actor
does not necessarily involve ‘buying’ every argument
from free-market ideologists; it provides no justific-
ation for using it deceitfully, and it most certainly
doesn’t justify disturbing the mechanism of the
market itself to give false value indicators to moral
actors, for example, price fixing, dumping, loss-
leaders, and so on, or using bad laws in some coun-
tries to make cheap product at cost to powerless
groups, animals, or the environment. A society im-
bued with the Principle of Goodness will be vigilant
in guarding against such malpractices, and will also
act to ensure proper pricing by bringing costs home
to the user. Examples are environmental destruction
and global warming. Destruction of the vegetation
on a plot of land, for example, might be conducted
for ‘free’ if a company bought the land cheaply, but
our posited society would charge the true cost any-
way, even if the locally involved parties all agreed
to permit it. And having a free market doesn’t pre-
vent having laws that prohibit some actions, no
matter what the cost. (For an extended discussion
touching on the wider implications of Smith’s work
beyond those recognised in ‘economic rationalism’,
including the importance of social ‘fabric’, see [Or-
merod].)
Example: Embryonic Stem Cells
So far we have talked in generalities, but room must
be found for one example, to show that concrete ad-
vice is provided by the theory, not mere ethical
platitudes. Our example concerns modern technolo-
gies permitting creation of human embryos, which
might be used to assist a family in having children,
in medical research, or in creating ‘spare parts’ and
stem cell lines for curing disease. Opinions on this
subject are often diametrically opposed and held
vehemently. Opponents of all such acts and those
approving of them have each called the other ‘mur-
derers’, one group thinking of the destroyed embryos
and the other of the lives that might be lost if they
are not destroyed. In a utilitarian calculus, by defini-
tion, one thinks of the relative quantities of good and
bad outcome, and judges accordingly; typically util-
itarians have supported such techniques and have
also by-and-large won the public debate on utility
grounds. Their opponents, often for religious reasons,
have found it hard to mount convincing counter-ar-
guments.
The following is howwe see the Principle to apply
in this situation. Some other interpretations are pos-
sible, but some are not. The Principle does not allow
us to deliberately harm the innocent, but it does allow
us to fail in avoiding such harm. When an innocent
is harmed, then, we must ask whether it was harmed
due to deliberate design or to failure to find a way
to protect. (Note that this most definitely is not
simply asking whether the harm came from action
or inaction.) In general, choosing to use some inno-
cents to benefit others must be regarded as deliberate
harm. Creating embryoswith the intention of destroy-
ing them in scientific research or in developing cures
for others is deliberate harm, and is therefore not
ethically justifiable, full stop. The objection that
much greater harm will come to existing persons
from such a refusal to act is simply irrelevant; creat-
ing an embryo in order to harm it is not available for
consideration; we most certainly need not intend
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harm to the existing persons in making this choice,
and we are completely free to exert every effort in
finding other ways to help them; but this way is not
available.
It might be objected that these embryos are not
yet sentient and do not quality for consideration.
Such a point is relevant when one is faced with a
conundrum, a failure to find a way through, as when
considering early abortions, where the mother and
the embryomight have conflicting interests; to object
that the embryo has no interests is relevant then. But
to set up a system of deliberate harm, bringing em-
bryos into existence in order to harm them, relying
on a disputed and uncertain theory about embryos
to assert that no being is thus harmed, this crosses a
line that is quite clear under the Principle, but not
under any consequentialist ethical theory.
So far, we believe, there is no doubt as to what
the Principle of Goodness prescribes, but the remain-
ing case is susceptible of differing opinions. Creating
embryos artificially as a reproductive aid does not
succumb to the above analysis. It might be necessary,
due to limitations in the technique, to create embryos
that are not used (perhaps in order to find one that is
viable and without defect), and the rest will be des-
troyed, but that destruction will not be deliberate
harm, it will be failure to find a way to protect. One
might judge that one has created it to give it a chance
at life, but has found that its life would be more
harmful than its death at an early stage. In this argu-
ment, we concede that others might analyse the
situation differently and reject even this reason for
using such techniques.
Considering that governments, such as the Aus-
tralian, are under increasing pressure to permit
cloning and embryonic stem cell research, a rejection
of the entire enterprise for reasons of fundamental
ethical principle is no small matter. If any thought
had been entertained that the Principle of Goodness
is merely a feel-good ethics with no real con-
sequences, it should be dismissed by this example.
Conclusion
We have discussed some aspects of the form of law
and society assuming a basis in the new ethical the-
ory, the Principle of Goodness, which, being a gen-
eral principle, must be combined with knowledge of
human nature and facts about existing conditions in
order to generate a specific recommendation on an
issue. We have had to place limits on the investiga-
tion owing to the immensity of the subject, but we
have provided one (controversial) example to show
that this ethic is not a mere form of words that can
support any opinion (although it can support a range
of opinions on most issues). In general, the kind of
society that is in accord with the Principle prizes
cooperation and a strong sense of what may be called
fraternity, whilst valuing individual conscience and
personal values. It will believe in the need for both
rights and responsibilities, in the sense we have dis-
cussed them here.
There is one final point to make before closing.
In actually changing a real society, one must do so
incrementally, in evolutionary steps, not revolution-
ary ones. Nothing, the Principle surely tells us, is
more contemptible than the “heroic experiments” in
societal structure during the twentieth century. To
regard real sentient beings, with all their capacity for
flourishing or for suffering, as cheap material for
social experiment is the very antithesis of Goodness.
The authors plan to pursue further investigation
of law and policy in the light of the Principle of
Goodness.
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